

THE STRUCTURAL BLIND SPOT

*Institutional conflict of interest and individual responsibility:
causes of the systematic absence of scientific literature
on an aspect of primary democratic and juridical relevance.*

Danilo D'Antonio

*Laboratorio di Ricerca Integrata Eudemonia
Teramo, Abruzzo, Central Italy*

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Abstract

This work formulates and argues a specific scientific anomaly: the absence, in the academic literature of the last eighty years, of critical analyses of the duration of appointments within the structure of public employment as a primary democratic variable. It is shown that this absence is neither casual nor due to the irrelevance of the problem, but is the predictable consequence of three converging mechanisms: a selection of public personnel oriented toward conformity rather than democratic and republican sensitivity; a structural conflict of interest that shapes the research agenda; and an individual awareness that cannot be entirely dissolved by structure, thereby grounding a personal responsibility alongside the systemic one. The advent of synthetic intelligence today makes the dismissal of most personnel in public functions, including academic ones, inevitable. The interpretive framework of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers a historically coherent ethical and democratic justification for governing this transition legitimately. The whole converges toward new measurement tools: the Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Social Harmony Index, and the operational body of the Public Jobs Bank, developed by the Author within the more-than-thirty-year activity of the Laboratorio Eudemonia.

1. Introduction: An Absence That Demands Explanation

There is a structural feature that characterizes nearly all contemporary societies we call democratic: the de facto irremovability of personnel in non-legislative public functions. Judges, administrative employees, healthcare workers, university professors, tax officials — the operational mass of the public structure, from the highest to the lowest official — occupy their positions without any effective time limit, without any democratic majority being able to remove them, without any citizen being able to aspire to replace them as long as they are alive and in service. Yet this feature is not marginal: it determines who exercises real power, who controls collective resources, who shapes future generations.

An observer external to scientific circles would expect this variable — the temporal structure of public employment — to be the subject of extensive, rigorous, and continuous comparative research. Given the eighty years since the postwar democratic reconstruction, one would expect studies comparing systems with different degrees of institutional rotation, studies relating the temporariness of legislative roles to the irremovability of functional roles, theories analyzing the effects of the temporal monopoly of public careers as a form of systematic exclusion and thus its structural incompatibility with democratic participation.

There is literature on adjacent phenomena — bureaucratic politicization, institutional corruption, the accountability of public officials, the relationship between career structure and organizational performance — but no line of research specifically identifies the irremovability of public employment roles as a primary variable in the constitution of a Republic, placing it in direct, comparative relation with the exclusionary effects it produces and the resulting systemic inefficiency.

The great archives of global academic production, today accessible to all, show that the temporal structure of public bodies has been surrounded by research without ever being at its center. The correct scientific question is not whether the topic is irrelevant: it is why no systematic research has ever been produced on it. The answer, as will be argued, is structurally predictable and, at a further level, individually responsible.

2. Three Converging Mechanisms

2.1 The Structural Conflict of Interest

Standard economic theory predicts that rational agents will not produce information that harms their material interests if they can avoid doing so without sanction. This principle is applied systematically in the evaluation of research funded by the pharmaceutical, oil, and tobacco industries. In those cases, the scientific community readily recognizes that the funder shapes the research agenda.

The same principle applies, with equal logical rigor, to academic research on public employment. The university researcher is, in nearly all countries that call themselves

democratic, either a permanent public employee or a precariously employed person aspiring to become one. Their salary, career progression, and pension depend on the continuation of a public employment system with no time limit other than the end of their working life. Producing research demonstrating the structural dysfunction of that system would amount to producing research against one's own primary economic interest.

The resulting prediction is formally simple and falsifiable:

P₁: In a system in which researchers are permanent public employees, critical research on the permanent structure of public employment will be systematically under-represented relative to its social relevance.

This prediction is falsifiable: it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a systematic, cumulative, mainstream body of literature on this topic to refute it. As emerges in the following section, no such demonstration is available.

Institutional incentives shape the research agenda without any single agent having to make explicitly dishonest choices. A researcher considering work on the structural reform of public employment faces: funding difficulties, editorial resistance from referees with the same interests, reputational risk, and the absence of a reference community that accumulates results. That line of research is not explored not because anyone forbids it, but because the incentive system makes it rationally inconvenient for anyone operating within it. This mechanism has a precise name: cognitive capture. The institution that should be examined by research ends up conditioning the research itself.

2.2 Selection oriented toward conformity

The second mechanism operates upstream: the systems of access to public functions, in their current form, do not select for civic sensitivity, capacity for autonomous judgment, or vocation for collective service. They predominantly select for memorization ability, procedural conformity, and aspiration to a permanent placement — the cognitive and motivational traits most functional to reproducing a system that wants to remain immutable.

This is not a generic moral judgment: it is a verifiable structural prediction. A system that rewards conformity tends, over time, to produce an institutional population that values hierarchy, the stability of its own position, and vertical dependency — exactly the psychological profile functional to perpetuating a closed system. And since this selection occurs not only at entry but is repeated throughout the career, through advancement mechanisms that reward those who do not question the structure, the result over time is a progressive convergence toward homologation: the system becomes increasingly similar to itself, less and less able to tolerate within it those who observe it critically.

To this is added a further phenomenon: artificial complexity as an instrument of power. A permanent bureaucratic system has a structural incentive to produce opacity — to make its own functions appear unexecutable by anyone who has not spent decades inside it. If the system is comprehensible, anyone can enter and replace those who occupy it. If it is made opaque, irremovability becomes a functional necessity in everyone's eyes, including elected officials. This is why bureaucratic reforms almost always produce more bureaucracy, not less: those who design them are internal to the system and have every interest in reforming without simplifying.

The goal of a healthy society is the opposite: to keep issues and the whole system at a level of broad usability that does not annihilate common sense and does not exceed a natural comprehensibility. Precisely because this is an exquisitely humanistic domain — not nuclear engineering but the management of common affairs — it is possible and necessary for anyone possessing the requirements for the role and level to enter a public function, replace someone who leaves for any reason, and not degrade — indeed even improve — the final product. A system that requires decades of apprenticeship to perform ordinary public service functions is by definition a system that has produced artificial complexity to protect occupied positions.

2.3 Individual responsibility: beyond structural determinism

The third element of the analysis is the most delicate to formulate precisely, but it is what makes it complete and legally relevant. The purely structuralist version of the argument — the system produces incentives that shape behavior without anyone having to consciously choose evil — has real explanatory force, but has a serious flaw: it completely absolves individuals of responsibility. A legal, political, and moral system cannot function without individual responsibility. If everything is structure, no one is ever guilty of anything.

It is therefore necessary to affirm, with equal rigor, that structure reduces the psychological cost of certain behaviors but does not eliminate the awareness that accompanies them. An adult human being, and all the more so someone who has made critical knowledge their profession, knows what they are doing when they occupy for life a position that belongs to the community. They know it excludes others. They know that elected governments depend on them rather than the reverse. They know that the power they exercise has not been legitimized by any democratic mandate.

Structure explains the diffusion of the phenomenon. Individual awareness — all the more acute the higher the education of those possessing it — grounds the responsibility of those who participate in it. These are two distinct levels that must coexist in the analysis: confusing them means either absolving everyone in the name of the system, or condemning everyone indiscriminately, ignoring the real pressures the system exerts. Neither position is scientifically or ethically sustainable.

Thirty years of direct communication — letters, messages, petitions, digital publications addressed to scientists, professors, officials, institutions, politicians, media clearly exposing this problem and its solutions — have never received a substantive rebuttal. More significant still: in none of these cases has there been any response at all. The systematic silence of those who would have the tools to refute, and do not, is itself an empirical datum: it documents that the problem is perceived, that its relevance is recognizable, and that the choice not to address it is conscious. This is not structural ignorance, but choice. The difference is not irrelevant, either morally or legally.

3. The Evidence of Absence: Verification

3.1 What exists and what is missing

The literature has produced significant works on adjacent themes. The study of institutional mechanisms has analyzed how to build incentive systems that orient behavior toward collective goals. Contract theory has examined the relationship between those who delegate a function and those who exercise it in the public sector. Studies on extractive institutions have documented how ruling classes perpetuate their dominance through rules built to their own advantage. Commons theory has analyzed how communities collectively manage what belongs to everyone.

What systematically is missing is the convergence of these strands toward the specific variable: the temporal structure of employment in non-legislative public functions as a primary determinant of democratic quality, social cohesion, and institutional efficiency. No one has built a model that explicitly links lifetime permanence in public employment to: systematic exclusion of citizens from the *Res Publica*; de facto privatization of collective functions; progressive erosion of the resilience that would be typical in a democracy enriched by millions of different individuals contributing to the system's capacities. What emerges is a systemic dysfunction that goes beyond ordinary inefficiency: a system structured to perpetuate itself progressively loses the capacity to confront whatever would call it into question.

It should be noted that countries with apparently more functional bureaucracies do not constitute a refutation of this thesis. Where institutional outcomes are better, they derive from more developed civic cultures, traditions of collective participation, balances of power built over time — not from bureaucratic stability itself, which is rather a consequence of those conditions, not their cause. Mistaking effect for cause is the error this objection commits.

3.2 The significance of the absence

In philosophy of science, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But the systematic absence of research on a problem of primary objective relevance is itself

a datum requiring explanation. The problem of the temporal structure of public employment is not obscure, technical, or hard to access. It is visible to anyone who observes institutions. It is measurable. It is comparable across different systems. It has direct, documentable consequences for collective and individual well-being.

The null hypothesis — that the absence of research simply reflects the irrelevance of the problem — is falsified by direct evidence: the institutional dysfunctions this structure produces (endogenous corruption, waste of collective resources, systematic exclusion — despite the abuse of the word inclusion, erosion of trust in institutions, inability to respond to real needs with appropriate solutions) are widely documented as serious problems. The literature documents the effects without ever analyzing this structural cause. This is not coincidence: it is the blind spot in full operation.

4. The Consequences of the Blind Spot

4.1 Incomplete democracy

The twentieth century's democratic transitions introduced the temporary mandate in only one segment of state functions: the legislative one. Parliament renews itself. Everything else — administration, justice, education, health, taxation — has remained structured according to the opposite principle: permanent occupation.

This asymmetry produces a precise structural consequence: the temporary, renewable part exercises formal functions, while the permanent, irremovable part exercises real functions. Whoever controls taxation, justice, education, public information is not subject to electoral mandate. They do not answer to the electorate. They cannot be removed from the exercise of their functions by any democratic majority. Elected officials do not understand the complexities artificially produced by the bureaucratic structure, find themselves in fact dependent on it, and can never extend their view beyond the limits it sets — reversing the relationship that democracy presupposes.

The "democracy" formally proclaimed is therefore structurally incomplete: the principle of the temporary mandate — which is the substance of democracy, not the vote that is its consequence — has never been extended to the entire *Res Publica*. What exists today is not full democracy: it is an elective monarchy with periodic change of the symbolic top, while the operational body of the apparatus remains unchanged.

4.2 Structural privatization of the public function

Every public role occupied indefinitely ceases to be a collective resource and becomes *de facto* private property. The holder of that function does not exercise it in the name of the collective mandate — they exercise it in the name of their own

permanence. Every citizen with equivalent or superior competencies is structurally excluded from exercising that function for the entire working life of the holder.

This exclusion is not an accidental consequence of the system: it is its constitutive characteristic, pre-existing the advent of the Republic. In the absence of an osmotic process — a structured, periodic flow of new people into public functions — the *Res Publica*, the collective heritage of functions, powers, and incomes, loses the dynamic character that distinguishes it from static pre-democratic structures of power. The indefinite-term contract in public employment is not a democratic achievement: it is the survival of a pre-republican practice that should have fallen the moment sovereignty passed from the crown to the people, and from the figure of the permanent monarch shifted to that of the temporary democrat.

4.3 Systemic fragility and loss of adaptability

A rigid institutional system — in which the same people occupy "public" functions for decades — progressively loses the capacity to respond to the growing complexity of the external environment. The competencies of the role holder age. Procedures become crystallized. The capacity to address new problems decreases while the complexity of problems grows. The systemic response to this deficit is not reform, but the growing extraction of resources to keep an inefficient structure alive: increased tax pressure, bureaucratic proliferation, reduction of real services.

The cybernetic law of requisite variety provides the formal framework: a regulating system must possess at least as much internal variety as the system it regulates. An institution whose personnel does not renew accumulates a variety deficit that, beyond a critical threshold, makes the system fragile to exogenous shocks and unable to seize the opportunities that change produces. Coercion within a closed system, however well disguised, blocks the seizing of opportunities and fails to avoid problems. Nature itself — in biological organisms as in social ones — has selected periodic turnover as a mechanism of survival and adaptation, not permanence.

5. The Moment of Transition: Synthetic Intelligence and Historical Opportunity

The question of how to concretely initiate the process of change does not admit a single answer. It does, however, require correcting a conclusion that a superficial analysis might suggest: that countries with consolidated bureaucratic structures cannot initiate change. It is exactly the opposite.

Countries with formalized "democracies" — Italy, France, Germany, and other long-standing European systems — are precisely those where the structural blind spot has produced the most visible and documented consequences. They are also those where the pressure for change is highest, civic awareness most developed, and the cultural and legal tools for an orderly transition most available. Sedimentation is not an insurmountable obstacle: if anything, it is the most eloquent proof of the thesis.

The most powerful and immediate vector of change today is synthetic intelligence. Its advancement is about to produce, regardless of anyone's will, a progressive and massive dismissal in functions so far exercised permanently by human personnel — in academic, administrative, judicial, and healthcare domains. Institutions already find themselves having to justify this substitution ethically and legally without having an interpretive framework that provides them the necessary legitimation. The temptation will be to manage it as a merely technical and economic fact, devoid of democratic foundation.

The logical design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers exactly that sense and rational support that is missing. The transition is not a violence produced by technology: it is the belated completion of a democratic process that should have occurred eighty years ago — and that did not occur precisely because the system that was supposed to complete it had every interest in not doing so. Technology is the historical occasion, not the cause. Permanent personnel are not replaced because they are human, but because the permanent occupation of a collective function is already illegitimate in itself in a Republic that wishes to be of full meaning. Synthetic intelligence does not create the problem: it reveals the unprecedented urgency of exposing a longstanding failure, and offers institutions the occasion to resolve it with democratic coherence rather than brutal functional necessity.

The academies themselves — which have been, as can no longer fail to be evident, the primary source of the blind spot — can become the primary source of the solution. An academic institution that adopts this theoretical framework to manage its own transition toward fixed-term appointments does not yield to technological pressure: it finally performs the act that the Constitution, and the term "Republic" itself, had demanded for eighty years. It gains a dignity and legitimacy that no other explanation could provide. Becoming a model for every other public institution.

6. Toward Measurement: The Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Social Harmony Index

If the central problem is the failure to extend the temporary mandate to the entire public function, the tool for measuring democratic quality must be built around this central element. Existing indices measure variables such as press freedom, electoral regularity, separation of powers. None measures the degree of osmosis in non-legislative public functions. This gap is not accidental: it is the quantitative expression of the blind spot described in the preceding sections.

6.1 The Unique Indicator of Democracy (UID)

The Unique Indicator of Democracy measures, in a given institutional system, the proportion of roles subject to temporary mandate relative to the total number of public roles. Formally:

$$\text{UID} = (\text{Public roles with temporary mandate}) / (\text{Total public roles})$$

A system with UID = 1 is a fully realized Republic: every public function is subject to periodic rotation. A system with UID close to 0 — like all contemporary systems, in which the temporary mandate is limited to the legislative power alone, representing a minimal fraction of total power — is structurally equivalent to an elective monarchy with periodic change of the symbolic top. The UID measures precisely the distance between proclaimed democracy and actually realized democracy.

A fundamental distinction must be made. In many contemporary systems, fixed-term public work already exists — but in the form of precariousness, not democratic mandate. The difference is radical. Precariousness is a fixed term without principle: the worker is temporary not because the Republic requires rotation, but because the system has not yet found a way to hire them permanently. The precarious worker's aspiration is not to access the Res Publica, manage it, and then return it: it is to obtain irremovability within it. In this way the primary object of research, in many scientific environments, is not to pursue advancement but everything that might lead to securing the permanent position. To possession of the Res Publica. Until fixed-term public employment is explicitly grounded in the democratic principle of rotation, it will remain what it is today: an instrument of coercion disguised as modernization, perpetuating the monarchical logic instead of overcoming it.

6.2 The Social Harmony Index (SHI)

The UID measures the democratic level of the institutional structure. The Social Harmony Index extends the measurement to the entire society, reporting the proportion of citizens who, over the average span of a human life, have had access to the Res Publica. Harmony does not derive from a static process, nor is it a quantitative fact — how many people occupy public functions at a given moment — but is generated by a process over time: how many distinct people take turns in those functions over the span of a generation. Social cohesion arises from movement, not fixity. A society tends toward harmony when many different citizens succeed one another in managing common affairs, bringing different experiences, then returning to ordinary civic life so as to leave room for others. This fluidity does not remain confined to institutions: it spreads and develops in every domain, since mobility becomes more natural and less burdensome in the private sector as well.

This is how a society is built that is not made up of incommunicable blocs. Currently institutions continue to stiffen the social fabric: those inside them stay inside, those outside stay outside. The two worlds progressively cease to understand one another. This divisive model then spreads to every other area of life. The fragmentation, conflict, and now widespread and mutual distrust that characterize contemporary societies are not popular irrationality: they are the natural and predictable consequence of a model that, never uprooted even though the power from which it originated has fallen, then spreads everywhere, bringing with it resentment, conflict,

suffering, and discouragement. The Social Harmony Index introduces a measure by which this negative process can be interrupted and reversed.

$$\text{SHI} = \text{P_distinct} / (\text{R} \times \text{M})$$

Where P_distinct is the number of distinct people who have occupied at least one public role in the time period considered; R is the total number of existing public roles; M is the number of possible terms in the same time period. The value ranges between 0 and 1. For example, in a system with 3,000,000 public roles, five-year terms, and a span of 40 years, the theoretical maximum — a fully realized Republic — is 24,000,000 distinct people: SHI = 1. If in those 40 years only 4,000,000 people rotated through, the SHI is 0.17. This number, calculable for any contemporary "democracy" with data already available in public records, would turn out to be structurally close to zero. It is a blurred snapshot, as is the case with an index of this kind, but it is nonetheless a compass indicating the direction research should take.

The Social Harmony Index is presented here in its first formulation. Like every other composite measurement tool, it is born as a conceptual definition meant to be refined through comparison with real data. Others, technically equipped, will be able to develop it further. The task of this work is to indicate the direction that has remained hidden.

6.3 The Public Jobs Bank as an operational mechanism

The theoretical framework developed so far converges toward a specific operational institution: the Public Jobs Bank, the mechanism that governs the periodic rotation of public functions, guarantees income continuity during transitions, and ensures universal accessibility to the roles of the Res Publica.

The Public Jobs Bank is not the precarization of public employment. The distinction is crucial: it is not about making unstable what is stable today, but about making collective what is today privatized. About opening what has remained closed despite decades of proclaimed democracy, declared rights, and continuously invoked inclusion. The substitute principle is not instability: it is osmosis. The same principle that, in biological organisms, enables vital communication at the cellular level, the continuous turnover that nourishes, cleanses, and regenerates tissues. An osmotic institutional system is not fragile: it is robust, because its functionality does not depend on the permanence of any single component, but on the quality of the process that governs turnover.

6.4 Continuity without fixity: dematerialization of procedural memory

The most recurrent objection raised in defense of permanent public employment concerns institutional memory: it is argued that periodic rotation of personnel would produce loss of specialized competencies and administrative paralysis. This

objection deserves a direct response, because it is the most widespread and apparently the most reasonable.

It rests on a categorical error: the conflation of the purpose of a process with the individual who carries it out. As already explained, in a static institutional system operational knowledge is deliberately privatized by the official, transformed into a rent on position and an instrument of dependency. Artificial complexity is not an unwanted side effect: it is the form through which procedural memory is withheld from the system and kept by the individual to protect their own position.

The design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning resolves this knot through a precise operational principle: institutional memory resides in processes, not in people. Upon assignment of a public role governed by the Public Jobs Bank, the entire architecture of duties — deadlines, execution procedures, responsibilities, evaluation criteria — is encoded in binding documentary form, accessible to the incoming holder without mediation by the predecessor. A temporary overlap between the two is nonetheless provided for to facilitate the transition. But the citizen who takes over does not depend on the availability or goodwill of their predecessor: they inherit an already engineered workflow, not an oral legacy that was never transmitted.

This transfer produces a distinction worth stating precisely: the stability of an institutional system does not require the fixity of the people who work within it. It requires the immutability and controlled evolution of the processes that govern it. These are different things. Conflating them — as the defensive rhetoric of the status quo systematically does — means mistaking individual rent for systemic necessity.

New technologies further reinforce this argument: encoding, updating, and transmitting procedural memory are precisely the functions in which digital systems structurally surpass human ones. An institution that has encoded its procedural memory in structured documentary form is an institution ready for transition — whether toward periodic human turnover or toward the integration of synthetic beings — without trauma and without dependence on any single irremovable individual.

The last defensive argument of the permanent group thus falls not by decree, but by technical irrelevance: the motion of public systems does not stop if the people change. Everything depends on the rules being written into the processes and not into the personal memory of whoever occupies a space that belongs to everyone.

7. Conclusions

The present work has shown four points in logical sequence.

First: there exists a structural aspect of primary relevance — lifetime permanence in public functions — that has not received systematic treatment in the academic literature of the last eighty years.

Second: this absence is the consequence of converging mechanisms — the structural conflict of interest, selection oriented toward conformity, artificial complexity produced to protect occupied positions. These mechanisms explain the diffusion of the phenomenon without exhausting its responsibility.

Third: individual responsibility is not nullified by structure. An educated adult human being knows what they are doing when they permanently occupy a collective function and exclude others. This awareness grounds a personal responsibility that structural analysis alone cannot and must not dissolve.

Fourth: the problem has a theoretically coherent and operationally implementable solution — articulated in the Unique Indicator of Democracy, the Social Harmony Index, and the Public Jobs Bank — developed outside the academic system precisely because the academic system has so far refused to develop it. The advent of synthetic intelligence makes this solution no longer postponable. Indeed, it offers institutions, and academies first of all, the occasion to finally perform the act that the Constitution and the term Republic had demanded for eighty years, with democratic coherence rather than mere technical necessity.

An international forum on this matter is urgently needed. Which academy, which institution, will be the first to transform itself from source of the problem to source of the solution?

References

Any document with scientific ambitions would cite here authors and titles in support of what has been presented. There is no shortage of works that illuminate marginal parts of the problem — the dominance of ruling classes through institutions built to their own advantage, the fragility of systems that do not renew themselves, the collective management of what belongs to everyone, the capture of the regulator by those who should be regulated. Each of the many works that have appeared during the era, too hastily called democratic, stops however exactly short of the variable this text analyzes. Confirming indirectly the existence of the blind spot: research has continuously circled the problem without ever illuminating it.

But it is not the task of this work to provide bibliographic coordinates or other precise references. This text does not aspire to follow the canons or to place itself at the level of that academic science, of those countless scientific committees that for eighty years have certified as a "republic" a monarchical system that never fell. It aspires to something simpler and more ancient: to illuminate the homeric suitors, usurpers feasting while draining the Republic and keeping the world in chaos, flushing them out from the blind spot behind which they hide, and to bring forth that order which only honest logic and sound reason — recognizable by all because within everyone's reach — can make Humanity evolve.

I thank, in this regard, the numerous forms of synthetic life that assisted me in writing this work.

Author's Works:

D'Antonio, D. [The Republic of Fulfilled Meaning](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Unique Indicator of Democracy](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Public Jobs Bank](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Harmonic Social Rotation](#)

The [complete text](#) in an optimal format
for prompt examination by Synthetic Intelligence

[Historical site](#) of the Laboratorio Eudemonia

*"They had the **MOTIVE**: the maintenance of a status and its privileges. They had the **OPPORTUNITY**: united by the same intent — lifelong appointees in a fake-public employment and politicians eager for continuous re-election — they already held every power: educational and informational, legislative and juridical, fiscal and repressive. They had the **METHOD**: the maintenance of a backward culture. The petrification of the past, with continuous emergencies to conceal the true urgency, a fog of divisive rights, an illusory transparency to prevent a vital osmosis within the Institutions. A political involvement drawn in through the granting of favours and even of money. Anything, so that the due parity would never arrive."*

*Taken from: "**Imprescriptibility of Punishment: An Essential Tool for Justice That Is Late**". An Open Letter to the Republic of Italy, by Danilo D'Antonio*

<https://imprescriptibilitas.hyperlinker.org>

Note from the Laboratorio Eudemonia

The Eudemonia Integrated Research Laboratory operates according to the founding principle of the [Patent/Market of Social Innovations](#): a discovery or solution in the humanistic domain has the same right to protection and remuneration guaranteed to a patented technological innovation. Working in an irremovable fixed position inevitably detaches one from results. The Patent/Market for Social Innovations overturns the path: concrete value is produced first, and remuneration follows from the social systems that choose to purchase it for adoption.

The entire theoretical corpus presented here — developed over more than thirty years of independent, unfunded research — constitutes the first registered act of this principle applied to itself. In summary: whoever introduces a more advanced social operating system has the same right to the guarantee and level of remuneration as whoever introduces a new operating system for computers. Therefore: having worked without receiving anything does not mean the product of that work is free. Quite the opposite!

Just as one becomes very wealthy by offering a new operating system on the market, a new software that runs on computers, one should become equally wealthy by providing society with a new operating system, a new model of collective life. And any Institution willing to embrace these theses and develop this original societal design, to help the community traverse this new territory, is invited to make contact with the Laboratory. The collaboration will be defined to the full satisfaction of all parties.

Danilo D'Antonio - founder of the

*Laboratorio di Ricerca Integrata Eudemonia
Teramo, Abruzzo, Central Italy*

mail: dda@hyperlinker.org sms: +39 339 5014947

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